

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 07568 031303Z

45

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

----- 031236

R 031000Z JUN 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 755

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

USMISSION GENEVA

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMCONSUL MUNICH

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY ROME

SOFIA 2139

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 7568

EXDIS

NOFORN

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR

SUBJ: CSCE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

REF: A. GENEVA 3993

B. MOSCOW 6669

C. MOSCOW 7190

1. WE ARE IMPRESSED WITH USDEL CSCE'S MASTERFUL ANALYSIS OF
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 07568 031303Z

THE CSCE PROCESS AND EUROPE (REF A.), AND FULLY SUBSCRIBE TO

ITS CONCLUSIONS. WE PARTICULARLY ENDORSE THE ADMONITION IN PARAGRAPH 11 AGAINST BASING WESTERN CONCESSIONS ON THE HOPE OF INFLUENCING SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS. WE THINK THIS POINT SHOULD BE UNDERLINED, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF SUCH WESTERN PRESS STORIES AS THE MAY 30 AP ACCOUNT FROM BRUSSELS QUOTING A HIGH ALLIED OFFICIAL TO THE EFFECT THAT A CSCE OUTCOME TO SOVIET LIKING WOULD STRENGTHEN ELEMENTS IN THE USSR FAVORING COOPERATION WITH THE WEST AND WOULD marginally INFLUENCE THE SOVIET SUCCESSION.

2. IT HAS BEEN A STANDARD SOVIET PLOY, GOING BACK EVEN TO STALIN, TO HINT THAT THE "GOOD GUYS" IN THE KREMLIN ARE IN NEED OF WESTERN CONCESSIONS TO KEEP THEM IN POWER. THE CURRENT WRINKLE IS THAT BREZHNEV ALLEGEDLY PLANS TO DIVEST HIMSELF OF HIS PRESENT HIGH OFFICE AT THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS AND NEEDS WESTERN CONCESSIONS SO THAT HE CAN WRAP UP HIS SCHEDULE AND DEPART AMID CLOUDS OF GLORY. SOVIETS HERE, PLAYING ON WIDESPREAD WESTERN FASCINATION WITH BACKSTAGE KREMLIN POLITICS, ARE PUSHING THIS PRIVATELY WITH THE AIM OF SECURING WESTERN CONCESSIONS WITHOUT A QUID PRO QUO.

3. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF BREZHNEV REMAINING IN OFFICE EVEN AFTER THE NEXT PARTY CONGRESS ARE MORE COMPELLING THAN THE RUMORED ALTERNATIVE PASSING THE BATON TO OTHERS OR ASSUMING AN HONORARY POSITION (REFS B AND C). ILL HEALTH COULD FORCE A DRASTIC SHIFT AT ANY TIME, BUT SOVIET DIFFICULTIES WITH POLITICAL SUCCESSION ARE GENUINE AND HAVE NEVER BEEN OVERCOME IN SMOOTH OR PAINLESS FASHION. IN ANY CASE, WHAT HAPPENS, OR DOES NOT HAPPEN, AT CSCE IS NOT LIKELY TO INFLUENCE THE SOVIET SUCCESSION OR EVEN TO HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON SOVIET DETENTE POLICY. WE ARE NOT PERSUADED (AS THE THESIS IN PARAGRAPH 10 OF REF A HAS IT) THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT CLEAVAGES IN MOSCOW OVER SOVIET CSCE POLICY OR TACTICS, ALTHOUGH IT IS VERY MUCH IN THE SOVIET INTEREST AT THIS POINT TO MAKE US THINK THERE ARE. A "WORST-CASE" (FROM THE SOVIET VIEWPOINT) CSCE BREAKDOWN COULD CONCEIVABLY HAVE EFFECTS INTERNALLY, BUT EVEN HERE IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHAT THEY WOULD BE OR WHETHER THEY WOULD AFFECT BREZHNEV OR "THE SUCCESSION". WHILE THERE ARE NO DOUBT SOME DIFFERENCES OF NUANCE IN THE KREMLIN, CSCE SEEMS TO US A GENUINELY COLLECTIVE SOVIET

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 07568 031303Z

INITIATIVE TO WHICH THE ENTIRE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS COMMITTED FOR EXCELLENT INTERNAL AND FOREIGN POLICY REASONS.

4. IN SUM, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE WEST NEED WORRY THAT ITS FIRM ADHERENCE TO CONSISTENTLY HELD POSITIONS IN CSCE WILL MARKEDLY INFLUENCE BREZHNEV'S POSITION, SOVIET ADHERENCE TO A DETENTE POLICY, OR THE SOVIET SUCCESSION STRUGGLE.

STOESSEL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: COLLECTIVE SECURITY, POLICIES, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 03 JUN 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ElyME
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MOSCOW07568
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750193-0776
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750686/aaaadayn.tel
Line Count: 115
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 75 GENEVA 3993
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ElyME
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <15 APR 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <26 SEP 2003 by ElyME>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CSCE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
TAGS: PFOR, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006